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“We can reverse the critical decline of wages and employment
among the disadvantaged in this country....The method is the
introduction of employment subsidies.…They take the form of
continuing tax credits to private enterprises for their continuing
employment of low-wage workers.”
Edmund S. Phelps, Rewarding Work (1997, p. 5)

Abstract
In the United States and Europe there has been renewed interest in
subsidizing firms that employ disadvantaged workers as a means of
addressing poverty and other social problems. In contrast, the
prevailing practice is largely to provide social welfare benefits directly
to individuals. Which approach is better? We re-examine the relative
merits of employee- versus employer-based labor market subsidies and
conclude there are good reasons to continue to rely on the direct,
employee-based approach. In practice, low-wage workers are seldom
either low-skill or low-income workers. Furthermore, workers who
might qualify for a firm-based subsidy are reluctant to so identify
themselves for fear of being stigmatized or labeled as “needy.” Thus,
employer-based subsidy programs have lower participation rates and
correspondingly higher per capita expenditures than employee-based
subsidy programs.

Introduction
There has been renewed interest in the topic of labor market subsidies
to disadvantaged workers; in the United States it reflects a growing
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concern over shifts in the distribution of earnings and income, and in
Europe a consequence of chronic unemployment. A prominent feature
of this interest—typified by Edmund Phelps’ (1997) widely discussed
proposal—is the notion of subsidizing employers of disadvantaged
workers as a remedy to social ills. Using firms as a tool of social
welfare policy stands in sharp contrast to the current norm of providing
earnings subsidies, food, and health insurance directly to poor
households or families.
Should we adopt a new approach? To decide the relative merits of firmbased subsidies versus employee-based subsidies one first needs to
identify the target population: who are we trying to help? In the context
of policies toward the disadvantaged, it is natural to focus on
individuals in low-income families. Because wages are an important
component of income, and because skill levels to some degree
determine wages, measuring wage rates and skill levels would seem to
be reasonable ways to identify low-income individuals. However, as we
show below, low-income, low-wage, and low-skill are not perfectly
interchangeable categories in practice, and the need to distinguish
among them figures strongly in our conclusions.
Specifically, simple employer-based approaches that subsidize lowwage workers are unlikely to be well-targeted because low-wage
workers are not necessarily either low-skill or low-income. It is
possible to improve targeting by singling out workers from low-income
families, but this practice tends to stigmatize workers, resulting in
extremely low participation rates and higher per capita expenditures.
As a consequence, a firm-based subsidy must be prohibitively large to
be as effective as a direct, employee-based subsidy. Therefore, we
prefer employee-based approaches and are pessimistic regarding the
success of the employer-based approach.
Our bottom line reflects experience as well as theory. Firm-based
programs, such as the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit and its successor, the
Work Opportunity Tax Credit, have been characterized by low
participation rates and limited success. In contrast, an employee-based
approach such as the Earned Income Tax Credit appears relatively
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successful in targeting the desired population, inducing additional labor
market participation, and raising incomes.

Analysis
The conventional approach predicts that employee- and employerbased subsidies have the same economic impact. (See Appendix 1 for
the details of a formal model of the impact of wage subsidies.) Why?
Intuitively, a subsidy to individuals who work increases the supply of
workers, which lowers the wage employers have to pay. However, even
at the lower market wage, the government subsidy raises the total wage
received by employees. Another way to achieve the same outcome is to
subsidize employers. This raises the demand for workers and leads to
higher wages paid to employees. In this case, however, even at the
higher wage the government subsidy results in a lower net cost for
firms.
If the two approaches were truly equivalent, one could pick a strategy
on the basis of some criterion other than the economic impact, e.g.,
ease of administration. Unfortunately, the conventional analysis ignores
several important features of the policy program. First, if the objective
is to help disadvantaged, low-income workers, then, we argue, one
cannot simply target the program at low-wage or low-skill workers.
Second, attempts to improve targeting typically rely on having potential
participants identify themselves to their prospective employers as
“needy,” which most are reluctant to do. These complicating factors
result in very low participation rates in employer-based subsidies
relative to worker-based subsidies. We consider each of these in turn.

Targeting Issues
In practice, it can be quite challenging to identify members of the target
population. To get a sense of the difficulty, consider the information in
Tables 1 and 2, which is based on a 1994 sample of households from
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The main
message of Tables 1 and 2 is that it is a mistake to utilize the terms
“low-wage,” “low-skill,” and “poor” interchangeably.1
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Low-Wage Workers. Using Table 1 we begin by highlighting the fact
that “low-wage” and “poor” are not the same. We define a low-wage
worker as someone whose average hourly wage is in the bottom 20
percent of all wages; in our data the cutoff is a wage below $5.93.2 We
define poor as pre-tax and pre-transfer household income below the
poverty line appropriate for the household size.
 Using these definitions, only 15.0 percent of the households
with low-wage workers are poor.

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Poor and Low-Wage Households
Household
Low-Wage1 (n=2847)
Poor (n=1716)
Characteristics
Mean
Standard
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Deviation
Percent Poor
15.0
35.7
100.0
0
Earnings2

$32,189

26,903

$2,823

4,762

Pre-Transfer Income

$37,650

27,081

$5,654

4,755

Post-Transfer Income

$38,121

26,788

$7,947

4,754

-$23,954

26,195

$5,925

5,023

Number of People

3.5

1.6

2.7

1.9

Number of Children

1.1

1.3

1.1

1.5

Number of Workers

2.1

1.0

0.5

0.7

Poverty Gap3

Percent Headed by
9.6
29.5
23.0
2.1
Single Mother
Percent Headed by
68.2
46.6
25.7
43.7
Married Couple
1
We define a low-wage worker as someone whose average hourly wage is
below $5.93, which marks the lowest quintile of the wage distribution.
2
All income and earnings amount are based on annual 1994.
3
Poverty gap is the difference between the U.S. Census Bureau poverty line
for the appropriate household size and the household’s actual pre-tax and
pre-transfer i ncome.
Source: 1993 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation,
individuals aged 14 years or older. All calculations use SIPP sample
weights.
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The mean annual, pre-transfer income of families with a low-wage
earner is $37,650, much higher than the average of $5,654 for poor
households. These dramatic differences in economic status derive from
large differences in labor force participation—households with a lowwage worker have an average of 2.1 workers, versus only 0.5 for poor
households.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Poor and Low-Wage Individuals
Poor Workers2
Individual
Low-Wage Workers1
(n=3408)
(n=740)
Characteristics
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Percent Poor
15.3
36.0
100.0
0
Wage
$4.32
1.41
$6.00
3.68
Hours Worked
972
704
1,005
686
Earnings
$4,424
3,668
$6,197
5,694
Pre-Transfer Income
$6,028
5,639
$6,994
5,737
Post-Transfer Income
$6,208
5,618
$7,612
5,615
Percent Receive
6.7
25.0
19.9
39.9
Transfers
Household Pre$38,384
27,102
$9,431
5,541
Transfer Income
Poverty Gap3
-$24,197
26,239
$5,480
4442
Percent Disabled
10.7
30.9
13.3
33.9
Percent Teenagers
28.7
45.2
10.7
30.9
Percent Elderly
7.1
25.7
2.0
14.1
Percent White
82.5
38.0
67.9
46.7
Percent Female
62.4
48.4
57.3
49.5
Percent Single
19.2
39.4
26.7
44.2
Mothers
Percent Single Men
13.8
34.5
11.6
32.0
Percent Single
14.7
35.4
11.5
32.0
Women
Percent Married
20.6
40.4
33.6
47.3
w/Kids
Percent Married w/o
13.5
34.2
3.6
18.7
Kids
Percent Married
34.1
47.4
37.3
48.4
Age
31.7
15.7
33.9
12.1
Years of Education
11.5
2.6
11.2
2.9
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Table 2 (continued)
Individual
Characteristics

Non-Working Poor1
(n=1902)
Mean
SD
100.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$2,342
3,141
$4,174
3,473
42.8
49.5

Low-Skilled Workers2
(n=2677)
Mean
SD
11.3
37.2
$7.86
11.03
1,250
766
$10,985
10,362
$12,194
10,915
$12,299
10,870
3.9
19.4

Percent Poor
Wage
Hours Worked
Earnings
Pre-Transfer Income
Post-Transfer Income
Percent Receive
Transfers
Household Pre$5,725
5,122
$38,163
24,122
Transfer Income
Poverty Gap3
$6,969
5711
-$23,960
23,371
Percent Disabled
27.9
44.8
10.0
30.0
Percent Teenagers
13.4
34.1
30.1
45.9
Percent Elderly
33.4
47.2
7.9
26.9
Percent White
65.5
47.5
82.8
37.8
Percent Female
67.8
46.7
41.6
49.3
Percent Single
19.1
39.4
15.6
36.3
Mothers
Percent Single Men
13.4
34.1
14.5
35.2
Percent Single
28.4
45.1
8.3
27.6
Women
Percent Married
15.2
35.9
24.6
43.1
w/Kids
Percent Married w/o
10.9
31.1
18.4
38.7
Kids
Percent Married
26.0
43.9
43.0
49.5
Age
47.8
22.1
35.3
16.8
Years of Education
9.8
3.2
8.9
2.5
1
We define a low-wage worker as someone whose average hourly wage is
below $5.93, which marks the lowest quintile of the wage distribution.
2
All calculations use SIPP sample weights. All income, earnings, and hours are
annual 1994.
3
Poverty gap is the difference between the U.S. Census Bureau poverty line for
the appropriate household size and the household’s actual pre-tax and pretransfer income.
Source: 1993 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation,
individuals aged 14 years or older, except self-employed individuals.

Demographic differences explain some of the difference in the rate of
employment. In particular, households with a low-wage worker are
much less likely to be headed by a single female (9.6 percent versus
23.0 percent) than poor households. This leads one to suspect that low-
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wage workers may often be secondary earners in relatively well-off
households, and therefore not the intended targets of wage subsidy
programs. Table 2 confirms this hypothesis by highlighting the
differences between low wage and poor individuals. On average, a lowwage worker contributes $6,028 to the average household income of
$38,384, or roughly one-sixth. In contrast, a worker in a poor family
averages $6,197 out of the mean household income of $9,431. Also,
compared to workers in poor families, low-wage workers are more
likely to be teenagers (18.7 percent versus 10.7 percent). Because lowwage workers have slightly higher levels of education (11.5 years
versus 11.2 years) and are more likely to be white (82.5 percent versus
67.9 percent) than poor workers, they may have higher labor market
opportunities than poor workers.
Low-Skilled Workers. Table 2 also shows that targeting “low-skilled”
workers is not the same as targeting “low-wage” or “poor” workers,
where low-skilled is defined as having less than a high-school
education. In many ways, the low-skilled workers are neither low-wage
nor poor.
 Only 11 percent of low-skilled workers are poor, that is, live in
poor households, and low-skilled workers on average earn higher
hourly wages ($7.31) than either low-wage workers ($4.02) or poor
workers ($5.60).
The earnings of low-skilled workers contribute a larger share to the
total household income than the earnings of low-wage workers,
suggesting that low-skilled workers are not as likely to be secondary
wage earners.
Finally, recall that most of the poor individuals are not working. One
reason is that 33.4 percent of the non-working poor are elderly. These
individuals may be “poor” only by our limited definition of pre-tax and
transfer income. Moreover, they are unlikely to be the main
beneficiaries of labor market-based policies.
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These computations are intended to be illustrative. Even so, they
indicate that targeting subsidies based on observable characteristics
such as education levels or wage rates does not guarantee a welltargeted program. Because low-wage employees, low-skilled
employees, and individuals in poor households are not the same people,
an employer-based subsidy to low-wage workers is not equivalent to an
employee-based subsidy to poor households. Most importantly, a
subsidy to all low-wage employees would likely encompass secondary
earners in non-poverty households; the (working) elderly, who may
have substantial assets; and a myriad of other configurations of skills
and incomes outside the targeted population.3
As noted at the outset, Edmund Phelps (1997), an economics professor
at Columbia University, proposes a comprehensive employer-based
subsidy to “reward employment of workers in eligible, low-wage jobs”
(p. 106), an approach intended to relieve the unemployment and
concomitant social ills of low-income households. But the cautionary
lesson of Tables 1 and 2 is that the adopted solution may not fit the
diagnosed problem.

Stigma
One way to circumvent the targeting problem is to require that
individuals identify themselves to employers that are participating in a
firm-based subsidy program. Unfortunately, this raises the specter of a
stigma associated with being part of the targeted population (Moffitt
1983). Stigma is more than a theoretical possibility. As a number of
experiments have shown, requiring members of the target group to
identify themselves to potential employers results in substantially
worse outcomes compared to when the target group does not identify
themselves: lower job-finding success, and lower participation rates
because groups required to identify themselves to employers to be
eligible for the subsidy often did not. (See Burtless 1985; Dubin and
Rivers 1993; and Hollenbecke and Wilke 1991.) Thus, issues in
targeting raise substantial questions regarding the efficiency of an
employer-based approach.
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Participation
Firms and households that consider participating in labor market
subsidy programs must weigh the costs of participation. Since these
programs are voluntary, firms will participate only if the economic
surplus on new hires plus the cost-saving on those already employed
exceeds the costs of compliance costs, such as paperwork. Similarly,
households will participate only if the new earnings more than offset
the compliance costs, such as filing a tax return.
When the participation rates of firms and households differ, direct
subsidies to workers and subsidies to firms are less likely to have the
same economic impact. In the extreme case, the point is obvious: if no
single firm participates (but households do), it will not be possible to
help workers via firms. The net effect of each approach depends upon
the participation rate, the degree to which subsidies induce additional
employment, and the size of the subsidy.
How different are the approaches? Suppose that firms participate in
employer-based subsidies only 80 percent of the time, while
households participate in employee-based programs at a rate of 85
percent. Under realistic labor market conditions, this requires an
employer subsidy at the rate of 25 percent to achieve the same increase
in employment as a 10 percent wage subsidy directly to workers.4
Empirical evidence indicates that the participation rate of firms in
employer-based wage subsidies is well below 80 percent, making the
size of an effective employer credit prohibitively large.

Direct Subsidies to Workers
The best example of a subsidy directly to workers is the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC). The EITC is a refundable income tax credit targeted
primarily at workers in low- and moderate-income families. By
“refundable” we mean that if the EITC for which a family is eligible is
greater than the amount of income tax it owes, the IRS issues a check to
the family for the difference.5 As income rises, taxpayers initially
continue to receive the maximum credit, but eventually the credit is
phased out. (See Appendix 2 for details, including a summary of
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statutory changes since its creation.) The refundable credit is paid most
frequently as a lump sum in a tax return.6 Childless taxpayers are only
eligible if they are between ages 25 and 65, and benefits are
substantially lower than for families with children, but there are no
additional categorical requirements for eligibility.
The EITC is based on the income of the tax unit, which is typically the
family—this avoids subsidizing low-wage workers in high-income
families. The age restriction for childless taxpayers guarantees that
teenagers and elderly, who are likely to be secondary earners, are not
eligible for the credit. There is some evidence that the EITC is welltargeted at demographic groups who are thought to be at risk for longterm labor force detachment. For example, estimates in the 1990s
suggest that between 47 and 60 percent of eligible participants were
single mothers (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Whitehouse 1996). In short,
the EITC appears to be targeted effectively.
It is not, however, perfect. If poverty defines the target group, the EITC
is not well-targeted in one major way. In an effort to minimize labor
supply disincentives, many families with incomes above the poverty
line receive the EITC. For example, Liebman (1998) estimates that
under 1996 rules, 80 percent of households with income between 100
percent and 150 percent of the poverty line receive the EITC.
There are at least three additional ways in which the EITC may not be
as effective as it could be. First, it is possible that the credit is
subsidizing high-skilled individuals who simply work few hours.
Second, Wiseman (1995) suggests that the EITC is not well-targeted at
very low-income households who are liquidity constrained on a monthto-month basis, because it is most frequently paid in a lump sum at the
end of the year. Similarly, if the family’s income is below the minimum
taxable income threshold, so that they are not required to file income
taxes, they may not trigger eligibility for the EITC, which is based on
submission of an income tax return. Third, if the household unit is
different from the income tax unit (consisting of legal spouse and
dependents), the EITC may be subsidizing families who are not in lowincome households. One example is unmarried, cohabiting couples
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whose joint income would make them ineligible for the EITC if they
were to marry.
There is no stigma attached to participation in the EITC. Ninety-nine
point five percent of recipients simply claim the EITC by filing
personal income tax returns; the remainder receive the EITC in their
paychecks throughout the year.7 Their employers need not know their
family income status. The costs of participating are also low: the family
only needs to file a tax return, and the Internal Revenue Service will
calculate their EITC.
Lack of stigma and ease of claiming are likely responsible for the high
participation rates in the EITC. Using 1990 data, gathered prior to the
expansions of the EITC enacted in 1990 and 1993, Scholz (1994) finds
that approximately 85 percent of those eligible for the EITC received it.
This participation rate is well above other income transfer programs
such as Food Stamps or the former Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC).8
The tradeoff with high participation rates has historically been high
rates of noncompliance.9 A 1997 report of the Internal Revenue Service
(1997) estimated that 25.8 percent of EITC benefits were overclaimed
in 1994.10 The primary source of error is taxpayers claiming children
who did not live with them for more than half the year (Scholz 1997).
In short, the EITC appears to be received by an appropriately targeted
group and succeeds in widespread participation.
But does it subsidize work? To the extent that the key issue is the
decision to work at all (not how much one works), the EITC appears
successful in subsidizing work. Analytically, the credit is designed to
have an unambiguously positive effect on labor force participation, and
this prediction is supported by empirical research. Eissa and Liebman
(1996) estimate that the labor force participation of single mothers
increased 2.8 percentage points relative to the labor force participation
of women without children (who were then ineligible for the EITC)
following the expansion of the EITC in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
More recently, Meyer and Rosenbaum (1997) find that the EITC
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explains 39 percent of the increase in the labor force participation rate
of single mothers between 1984 and 1996.
However, for those already working, the EITC is not well-designed for
increasing hours worked. Subsidizing the earnings of workers may
result in individuals choosing to work fewer hours and consume more
leisure, without lowering their income. Secondary earners, in particular,
have large incentives for lowering their hours or exiting the labor force
because their earnings would place the family in the EITC’s phase-out
range or leave the family ineligible for the EITC.
For the most part, these predictions are upheld in the empirical
literature. Eissa and Hoynes (1998) find that the EITC expansions
between 1984 and 1996 lowered the labor force participation rate of
married women by 3.1 to 4.2 percentage points and reduced the hours
worked by married men 2 percent, or 45 hours/year, and women by 3.5
percent or 73 hours/year. One exception to these findings is Eissa and
Liebman (1996), who find that the expansion of the EITC after the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 had little effect on hours worked for single parents.
Ignoring any behavioral responses to the EITC, the Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities (1998) shows that the EITC moved 4.6 million
people, including 2.4 million children, out of poverty in 1996. This
accounts for 8 percent of the pre-government transfer poor (14.5
percent of the pre-government transfer poor children). Liebman (1998)
estimates that the EITC offsets 12 percent of the total poverty gap for
households with children.
However, as just noted, it is not strictly appropriate to ignore behavioral
responses, because individuals can actually increase their income while
working fewer hours. The Eissa and Liebman (1996) finding that single
women did not change their hours in response to an expansion of the
EITC suggests that income (net of EITC) of those in the labor force
increased. Eissa and Hoynes (1998) find that on average the expansions
in the EITC between 1984 and 1996 increased income by an average of
$927 for married couples, conditional on no changes in labor force
participation. They note that accounting for secondary earners dropping
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out of the labor force lowers this number by at least 10 percent, and
reductions in hours worked by those who remain in the labor force
would lower this average even more.

Subsidies To Employers
Current incarnations of the employer-based wage subsidies, such as the
Work Opportunity Tax Credit and the Welfare to Work Tax Credit,
reimburse employers for a fraction of wages paid to targeted group
employees up to a maximum. Administered through the tax system, the
targeted groups include people at risk for long-term labor force
detachment, such as welfare recipients, at-risk youths, ex-felons, and
veterans. The federal credits are available to firms that hire members of
these targeted groups within a specified time range.11
These income-tax credits also place very strict compliance
requirements on employers. For example, employers must begin to
certify the eligibility of the employee by the day the individual begins
work and have completed the process by the twenty-first day after the
individual begins work (Internal Revenue Service 1998a and 1998b).
Eligibility is often dependent on the employee being paid some
minimum wage and working a minimum number of hours. In addition,
existing programs limit the length of time a firm can claim the same
employee—typically one or two years.
One obvious benefit of requiring employees to be members of those
categorical groups is that the employer-based programs are better
targeted than the EITC. By definition, the employer-based wage
subsidy recipients are members of groups at risk for long-term labor
force detachment.
Although the existing employer-based subsidies, e.g., the Work
Opportunity Tax Credit and the Welfare to Work Tax Credit, are too
new to evaluate their effectiveness, their design is similar to the
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC), which was in place between 1978
and 1997. Lessons from the TJTC are not promising for the success of
existing programs.
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In particular, a striking feature of the TJTC was the low participation
rate—estimates of the participation rate by eligible group members in
the TJTC are all below 10 percent. For example, Katz (1996) estimates
that in the mid to late 1980s, approximately only 9 percent of those
eligible to participate were ever claimed, and Lerman (1982) estimates
that fewer than 4 percent were claimed through 1980. Recall that an
estimation of the EITC participation rate is 80 percent.
Two explanations for the discouragingly low participation rates have
been offered in the literature. First, to claim the credit, the employer has
to know the employee is a member of the target group and, as we
described above, this identification may cause stigma and lower
program participation. This hypothesis is supported by the experiments
described above that tested for stigma. With respect to the TJTC,
Bishop and Kang (1991) found that many employers cited the
anticipated low quality or skill of the targeted group members as a
reason for not recruiting among this group. These issues do not arise in
the EITC when employers do not have the same level of information
about their low-wage employees.
The expense of meeting strict compliance requirements are a second
explanation for the low participation rates in the TJTC. For example,
Katz (1996) notes that many of the firms that chose to participate in the
TJTC were large firms that could afford the fixed cost of contracting
with management assistance companies to review and certify the
eligibility of potential employees. The implication is that smaller firms
could not incur the additional cost.
Because the existing employee-based wage subsidies require
employees to identify themselves as members of the targeted group,
and because the compliance costs are similar to those in the TJTC, we
hypothesize that current wage subsidies will also be plagued by very
low participation rates.
Low participation rates suggest that the employer-based wage subsidies
have limited potential for increasing labor force participation or
income. Still, the TJTC was found to have a positive effect on
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employment participation among the targeted groups. Using data from
before and after a statutory change in the TJTC that lowered the
maximum age for eligible youths, Katz (1996) shows that the TJTC had
a modest effect on employment for disadvantaged youths. This result is
generally consistent with earlier research and suggests that, like the
EITC, employer-based subsidies have the ability to increase labor force
participation.

Conclusion
The notion of using firms as a tool to implement social policy toward
the disadvantaged has become increasingly more popular. Our goal has
been to evaluate employer-based versus employee-based wage
subsidies. In practice, wage subsidies to firms for hiring low-wage
workers do not necessarily reach low-skilled workers or poor
households. Therefore, to achieve distributional objectives using a
wage subsidy to employers the program must be very highly targeted.
This restriction leads to stigmatization of the potential employees and
results in a program that reaches a very low percentage of eligible
individuals. Although participation rates are very low, empirical
evidence from previous employer-based wage subsidies suggests that
these subsidies do have the potential to raise the employment levels of
the targeted groups. Unfortunately, low participation and the resulting
higher per capita cost implies that the total size of an employer-based
subsidy program must be quite large to yield the same benefits as an
employee-based program.
Wage subsidies paid to employees do not require the same strict
targeting. For example, the income tax system is a mechanism for
identifying low-income families. The EITC is available to all families
with income below a given level and the participation rate in the EITC
is very high. The more universal coverage of the employee-based wage
subsidy comes at the cost of being less well-targeted than an employerbased wage subsidy. To minimize labor force disincentives, many nonpoor families receive the employee-based wage subsidies.
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However, existing empirical evidence suggests that the EITC has had
widespread success at raising the labor force participation rate of many
primary earners, including single mothers. We doubt that an employerbased subsidy could overcome the barriers it creates to reach a similar
magnitude. Further analysis of the Welfare to Work Tax Credit and the
Work Opportunity Credit, which were implemented during a tight labor
market, may provide insight into this hypothesis.

Endnotes
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1

The SIPP surveys households every 4 months. We base our
statistics on household composition in December of 1994 and
use the household head in that month to aggregate over a year.
The household information is based on the information
reported by the head. We, therefore, drop households whose
heads were not in the sample for the entire year (approximately
20 percent of the sample) because the annual income variables
would be incomplete. We only include individuals in the
summary statistics if they are present for the entire year when
we calculate summary statistics for individuals. Additionally,
we drop approximately 200 persons because they do not
accurately match up with a household head or because they are
in a household that reports negative pre-transfer income.
Finally, we exclude self-employed individuals from the
individual statistics due to the difficulty of measuring wages.

2

We use point-in-time measures of wages to be consistent with
other data sets like the Current Population Survey. For
individuals who do not report a wage, we calculate their wage
as monthly hourly earnings. The results are similar when we
use average annual wage. We define workers in our sample as
individuals who report positive hours and earnings.

3

This has also been the topic of recent minimum wage
discussions including Burkhauser et al. (1996) and Neumark et
al. (1998).

Stacy Dickert-Conlin and Douglas Holtz-Eakin

4

This calculation assumes that firms have modestly elastic

(
)
supply ( ε = 0.6 ) of labor.

demand for labor ε d = −1.1 and workers relatively inelastic
s

5

Ten states also have EITCs that are tied to the federal EITC.

6

Employees have the option to receive the EITC with their
paychecks. According to the General Accounting Office
(1992), only 0.5 percent of EITC recipients get the credit in
advance.

7

Holtzblatt and Liebman (1998) note that one difficulty with the
advance payment of the EITC is that “workers have to forecast
what their total earned income, modified adjusted gross income
and family status will be at the end of the tax year” (p. 12). A
miscalculation could result in workers having to repay some or
all of the advance payment. The issue is further complicated for
workers who have more than one job or workers in a twoearner family because the tables for calculating the advance
payment are not designed to reflect more than one job
(Holtzblatt and Liebman 1998).

8

Liebman (1998) cites two sources that suggest that the
administration costs of the EITC are also very low, between 1
and 3 percent of benefits paid (compared to 16 percent for
AFDC).

9

Noncompliance has been a large concern with the EITC.
Scholz (1994) estimates that 30 percent of the EITC claimants
were ineligible in 1988. The General Accounting Office (1997)
reports that in 1994, of the $17.2 billion in EITC claims, $4.4
billion was overclaimed.

10

This number does not reflect recent changes in legislation
aimed at decreasing noncompliance, nor does it account for the
fact that the family may have been eligible for some portion of
the payment-in-error (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
1998).
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11

Many states have employer-based wage subsidies in their state
income taxes and as a component of their recent welfare reform
pages. The federal Work Opportunity Credit is currently set to
expire for individuals hired after June 1999.
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Appendix 1
To begin, revisit the basic supply and demand framework shown in
Figure 1. In the diagram, l d (w) denotes the demand for low-skill
labor and l s (w) denotes the supply of low-skilled labor. The

equilibrium quantity of labor (l * ) and the equilibrium wage (w*)
are determined by their intersection.

Consider the introduction of a subsidy to employers of low-skill
workers taking the form of a tax credit at the rate of c per dollar of
wage payments to these workers. As shown in the figure, this produces
three important effects. First, the demand for labor shifts outward; at
each level of wage payments to workers, the effective cost to firms
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falls. Second, the equilibrium quantity of labor used rises to l ′. Finally,
the market wage rises to w′ at the same time the cost to employers falls
to (1-c)w′ . In effect, the workers capture a wage increase equal to
w′ − w* , while employers benefit from a decline in wages equal to
w* − (1 − c ) w′ .
Of course, in this simple setting, it is equally possible to represent a
subsidy given directly to workers; in this case it takes the form of a tax
credit equal to e per dollar of wage earnings. Again, the subsidy
produces three effects. First, the supply curve for labor shifts outward;
at each wage, w, offered by firms the workers receives a total of
w (1 + e ) , leading to greater labor supply. Second, the equilibrium
quantity of labor rises to l ′′ . Finally, the cost to firms (the market
wage) falls to w′′ , while the wage cum subsidy for workers rises to
w′′ (1 + e ) .

The most important lesson from the basic framework is that for
equivalent subsidies (those where e=c/(1-c)), the impact of the
employer-based subsidy and the impact of the employee-based subsidy
is identical. That is, l ′ = l ′′, (1 − c) w′ = w′′, and w′ = w′′(1 + e) .
From the standpoint of policy, there are two important implications of
this equivalence. First, ex post, the evaluation of the program must
acknowledge the economic repercussions. Since payments to
employers will help workers just as much (or little) as direct payments
to the individuals, we cannot rely simply on the size and statutory
recipient (employer or employee) of subsidy payments to decide the
impacts.
Second, because the economic benefits will be determined by market
fundamentals, the administrative structure of the program may be
chosen to minimize the difficulties of implementation. That is, the
administrative structure of the program and distributional objectives are
not linked in this simple framework.
Consider a more realistic framework. To begin, return to an employerbased subsidy. For simplicity, assume that that subsidy takes the form
of a credit at the rate c per dollar of wage payments to the targeted
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workers. This has the immediate effect of shifting the demand curve
from ld to ld’, as shown in Figure 2, and lowering the employer’s cost of
labor. In contrast to the basic framework, however, there are further
effects. First, to the extent that being identified with the targeted
population is associated with stigma, the need to identify the recipients
acts to inhibit the supply of this type of labor. In the context of Figure
2, there is an upward shift in the supply curve to ls’ from ls. The new
equilibrium wage is now w’. The effective wage received by employees
is w’/(1+s), where s is the “wage-equivalent” rate of stigma. From the
perspective of firms the cost of labor falls from w to w’(1-c).
Obviously, unless w’/(1+s) is greater than w’(1-c), in other words, c
exceeds s/(1+s), there is no effective subsidy as a result of the program.
Assuming that c is sufficiently large, the outward shift in demand
exceeds the shift backward in supply, the quantity of labor rises from
l b (“before”) to l a (“after”).
Will firms participate? If the fixed costs of running the program are F,
then the firm will net an economic advantage if

∫
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lb

[ MPl − w′( 1 − c )] dl + [ w − ( 1 − c )w′ ] l b ≥ F .

(1)
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That is, the sum of the surplus on new labor plus the cost-saving on
extant workers must exceed the fixed costs. Clearly, firms with low
labor productivity and/or high fixed costs will be less likely to
participate. To further clarify, assume that MPl = w —i.e., that we are
operating in the region of the initial equilibrium. If so, this reduces to

[ w − (1 − c) w′]l a ≥ F or w − (1 - c) w′ ≥

F
.
la

(2)

A firm will participate if the wage-saving per worker exceeds the fixed
costs per worker. The likelihood of participating will rise with the size
of the subsidy (c), and will decline as the fixed costs (F) decline. Recall
that w′ is valued at w′ / (1 + s ) so that the larger is s the lower is the
likelihood that the firm will participate.
For comparison, let us turn now to an employee-based system.
Individuals choose their participation based on the utility function
U(C,L-h) where C is consumption, L is the endowment of leisure, and h
is labor supply. If the program consists of an earnings credit at a rate e,
and A is non-labor income, then in the absence of the program the
individual will have consumption of

cb = whb + A .

(3)

In contrast, in the presence of the program it will be given by

cb = w′′(1 + e)ha + A

(4)

where w′′ is the wage paid by firms. The individual will participate if
the utility gain is sufficient to outweigh the fixed compliance costs, G
(measured in utility terms) of the program, that is, if

U ( w′′(1 + e)ha + A, L − ha ) − G − U ( whb + A, L − hb ) ≥ 0.

(5)

To gain a better feel for the decision, we can linearize around the noprogram level of utility, yielding
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(

) (
} {

)

U w(1 + e)h + A, L − h ≈ U wh + A, L − h
a
a
b
b .
+U w′′(1 + e)h − wh − U h − h
C
a
b
L a b

{

}

(6)

Thus, an individual will participate if:

w′′(1 + e)ha − whb −

UL
(ha − hb ) − G ≥ 0
UC
UC

(7)

Note that if the individual is supplying labor in the absence of the
program, U L / U C is equal to the wage. However, if the individual is
not participating (as would likely be the case for the target population),
U L / U C equals the reservation wage, w*, needed to induce
participation. If, as before, we examine the participation decision in the
vicinity of w* = w , the individual will participate if

[ w′′(1 + e) − w* ]ha ≥

G
G
or [w′′(1 + e) − w * ] ≥
.
U c ha
UC

(8)

As with firms, individuals will participate if the wage incentives (in this
case increases) are sufficient to outweigh the fixed costs per unit.
Examining this condition more closely, it is apparent that individuals
with higher reservation wages (e.g., single mothers or others with a
high value of leisure) will be less likely to participate. It follows that
individuals will be more likely to participate in the program as their
reservation wage falls, or as the subsidy rate rises. Similarly, as the
complexity (as measured by G) or other overhead aspects of the
program become smaller, individuals will be more likely to participate.
Are the employer- and employee-based approaches still equivalent?
With the added detail, this appears far less likely. For the programs to
be equivalent, they must induce equal changes in the labor market.
Specifically, if Nf is the number of firms and p is the probability that a
firm participates, the post-subsidy labor demand under the firm
program is given by pN f l a . Similarly, if r is the fraction of
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individuals who participate out of the Nh households, the post-program
employment is rN h ha . Thus, we require that

p( F , c , s )N f l a = r( G , e )N h ha

(9)

which shows that p and r depend on the structure of the programs. In
turn, l a and ha depend upon the elasticities of labor demand and
supply (respectively) and the fall (rise) in the net wage facing firms
(households).
There are many dimensions along which this equivalency may break
down. First, the employee-based approach does not raise the possibility
of supply-inhibiting stigma from forcing workers to identify themselves
as, for example, welfare recipients. Second, the determinants of firms’
participation in the low-wage subsidy program (productivity,
administrative costs) are not mirrored by the determinants of
individuals’ participation in the employee-based subsidy program
(reservation wages, complexity) leading to differences in p and r.
We can add a little analytic detail to this introspection. Assume for the
moment that p(F, c, s) and r(G, e) are constants and recognize that
^

^

^

^

ha = (1 + h)hb and l a = ( 1 + l )l b , where h and l are percentage
changes in labor demand and supply, respectively. In turn, recognize
that changes in the quantity of labor derive from changes in wages
induced by the program parameter. That is:
d

^

l=

d

−

s

(c − s ), h =
s

d

^

d

−

s
s

(e)

(10)

ZKHUH dLVWKHZDJHHODVWLFLW\RIGHPDQGDQG s is the wage elasticity
of supply. Finally, note that N f l b = N h hb if the labor market is
initially in equilibrium and collect terms to yield

 c−s
 c
 = r 1 + 
p1 +





(11)

where
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=

d

−
d

s
s

.

As a final step, we can rearrange equation (11) to highlight the
relationship between equivalent-outcome employer-based subsidies and
employee-based subsidies. Specifically:

r
c = s +  e +
 p

r

 − 1
p 

(12)

The expression in (12) has several implications for the design of a
subsidy program. Notice first that for any given size of employee-based
subsidy (e) the presence of stigma effects (s) directly raises the size of
the employer subsidy necessary to have equivalent effects. Second,
note that if participation by workers in the employee-based program
exceeds that by firms in the employer-based program, then (r/p) > 1
and c must exceed e, ceteris paribus. Essentially, even if there is no
change in behavior, lower (relative) participation necessitates a higher
rate of subsidy to achieve the same outcome.
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Appendix 2: Federal Employer- and EmployeeBased Subsidy Programs
Employer-Based Subsidies
:RUN2SSRUWXQLW\7D[&UHGLW
 Target Group: (1) Individuals who live in a family that received
AFDC/TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) in 9 of the
18 months before the hire; (2) 18- to 24-year-olds or veterans in
families receiving Food Stamps; (3) SSI (Supplemental Security
Income) recipients; (4) ex-felons and several other at-risk groups.
 Subsidy Rate in 1999: 40 percent of qualified wages up to $6,000
for employees who work at least 400 hours; 25 percent for employees
who work btween 120 and 400 hours (for employees hired between
September 1996 and July 1999).
 Compliance Requirement: Employer must certify eligibility of
employee by the day the employee begins work, or the 21st day after
the individual begins work.
 Other Notes: Employer cannot claim both the Work Opportunity
Tax Credit and the Welfare to Work Tax Credit for the same employee.


Time Limit: One year.

:HOIDUHWR:RUN7D[&UHGLW
 Target Group: Long-term welfare recipients: (1) individuals who
have received AFDC/TANF for at least 18 consecutive months prior to
hire, or received AFDC for any 18 months after August 5, 1997; (2)
individuals ineligible for assistance because welfare time limits are
binding.
 Subsidy Rate in 1999: 35 percent of qualified wages up to
$10,000 for the first year of employment; 50 percent of qualified wages
for the second year.
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 Compliance Requirement: Employer must certify eligibility of
employee by the day the employee begins work, or the 21st day after
the individual begins work.
 Other Notes: Employer cannot claim both the Work Opportunity
Tax Credit and the Welfare to Work Tax Credit for the same employee.
Employer can claim this credit only if employee worked at least 180
days or 400 hours.


Time Limit: Two years.

Employee-Based Subsidy
(DUQHG,QFRPH7D[&UHGLW (,7&
 Target Group: Low-income households with earnings; available
to childless individuals who are at least 25 but less than 65 years old.
 Subsidy Rate in 1999: No children, 7.65 percent of earnings
beetween $0 and $4,530, maximum credit of $347, phased out at 7.65
percent for income between $5,670 and $10,200. One child, 34 percent
of earnings between $0 and $6,800, maximum credit of $2,312, phased
out at 15.98 percent for income between $12,460 and $26,928. Two or
more children, 40 percent of earnings between $0 and $9,540,
maximum credit of $3,816, phased out at 21.05 percent for income
between $12,460 and $30,580.
 Compliance Requirement: Must file personal tax return; must
report child’s social security number.
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Other Notes: Refundable credit; paid as a lump sum.



Time Limit: None.

